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Abstract 
We test the equivalence of income and consumption taxes through a choice experiment. Under a 
given set of income and consumption parameters, subjects were asked to choose among an 
income tax of 20%, a consumption tax of 25% (which is an equivalent tax burden), a 
consumption tax of 22%, and a consumption tax of 20%. Our results showed that subjects prefer 
income tax to consumption tax when the nominal consumption tax rate is higher than the 
nominal income tax rate. However, subjects tend to prefer consumption tax to income tax when 
the nominal tax rates are identical. Our result, that subjects prefer income tax to consumption 
tax despite a higher tax burden, implies the consumption tax miscalculation bias. The 
consumption tax miscalculation bias is one where subjects miscalculate the amount of 
consumption tax as if it is declared by tax inclusive, as in the case of income tax, despite 
consumption tax being tax exclusive. If the income tax burden is equivalent to the consumption 
tax burden, subjects prefer income tax. This result implies that income and consumption taxes 
are not equivalent due to the consumption tax miscalculation bias. 
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1. Introduction
It is well known that consumption tax is equivalent to labor income tax in the public finance
literature. These taxes are theoretically equivalent taxes because the budget constrain with 
consumption tax coincides with that with income tax. However, Blumkin et al. (2012) showed 
that these taxes are not equivalent in a real-effort experiment.１ In their experiment, subjects 
reduce their effort more in response to income tax than to equivalent consumption tax. This 
result implies that people behave differently when confronted with one tax than when 
confronted with the other tax even though these taxes are substantially equivalent. 
Such an irrational behavior is observed by a field experiment, an empirical study, and a 
laboratory experiment. Chetty et al. (2009) showed that, in comparison with tax-exclusive price 
tags, tax-inclusive price tags reduce sales by 8%.２  Finkelstein (2009) showed that the 
introduction of electronic toll collection led to a reduced sense of financial burden and resulted 
in an increase in toll fare. Moreover, some field experiments tested whether people behave 
differently when they get information or advice about tax systems and benefits (Bettinger et al. 
2012; Chetty and Saez 2013; Liebman and Luttmer 2011). 
The misperception of taxes shown in Blumkin et al. (2012) and Chetty et al. (2009) results 
from ignorance about consumption tax. In the study of Blumkin et al. (2012), subjects reduce 
effort under income tax, because their nominal earnings decrease and they cognize the income 
tax. On the other hand, under consumption tax, subjects provide effort without considering the 
existence of the consumption tax. Therefore, we can propose that the reason income and 
consumption taxes are not equivalent is the consumption tax “ignorance bias.” In Chetty et al.’s 
(2009) study, consumers buy many more goods when price tags are tax-exclusive than when 
they are tax-inclusive. This is because consumers ignore the consumption tax when goods are 
posted tax-exclusive price tags. The ignorance of this tax results in irrational behavior. 
The misperception of taxes results from the miscalculation of taxes even when people take 
into consideration the existence of taxes. For example, some research points to the confusion 
between average and marginal income tax rates (de Bartolome 1995; Liebman and Zackhauser 
2004; Feldman and Katuščák (2006). Abeler and Jager (2015) showed that subjects cannot 
behave optimally in a complex progressive income tax system, but can behave optimally in a 
１ Although there is no other experimental study that tests the equivalence of income and consumption 
taxes, there are some experimental studies that test the tax incidence equivalence. This means the burden 
of a tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. The tax incidence equivalence 
holds in a simple market (Kachelmeier et al. 1994; Borck et al. 2002; Ruffle 2005). However, it does not 
hold in an ultimatum game (Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger 2000) and voting (Sausgruber and Tyran 2005, 
2011). 
２ Feldman and Ruffle (2015) showed a similar result in a laboratory experiment. Their subjects spend 
more under tax-exclusive prices while total purchases under tax-inclusive and tax-rebate prices are not 
different. 
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simple progressive income tax system. We can interpret this as the income tax “miscalculation 
bias” leads to a misperception of taxes. 
According to the results of Blumkin et al. (2012), we can deduce that the equivalence 
between income and consumption taxes holds if people can properly take into consideration the 
existence of consumption tax. However, previous research shows that the miscalculation of 
income tax also results in the misperception of tax. Thus, even if people take into consideration 
consumption tax, the equivalence between income and consumption taxes might not hold if 
people miscalculate the tax burden from either tax. For example, it is likely that many people 
misperceive consumption tax being equivalent to income tax when the tax rates are the same.３ 
Assuming that all income is spent on consumer goods, if total income is $1 million and the 
income tax rate is 10%, the amount of tax is $100 thousand. If the consumption tax rate is 10%, 
people often misunderstand it as being imposed on the amount of goods that already include tax 
and believe that the amount of tax would be $100 thousand, though the correct amount of tax 
would be $91 thousand.４ Because people do not correctly understand that the way income tax 
is applied is different from the way consumption tax is applied, people might not understand 
that the amount of income tax is not equivalent to the amount of consumption tax when all 
income spent on consumer goods and the income and consumption tax rates are the same. In 
other words, consumption and income taxes might not be equivalent because of the 
consumption tax miscalculation bias. 
In Blumkin et al.’s (2012) study, the consumption tax ignorance bias is one of the 
explanations why income and consumption taxes are not seen as equivalent and subjects prefer 
consumption tax to income tax. Another explanation is that their incomes are determined by the 
performance of real-effort task. Durante et al. (2014) showed that subjects choose a lower 
income tax rate when their incomes are determined by effort than when their incomes are 
determined by luck. This result implies that subjects do not strongly prefer income tax when 
their incomes are determined by a real-effort than when their incomes are determined randomly. 
Therefore, subjects might tend not to prefer income tax, when their incomes are determined 
randomly, and in these cases, income and consumption taxes are equivalent. 
Our research question is whether income and consumption taxes are equivalent. If the 
equivalence does not hold, we can identify the following reason: Consumption tax ignorance 
bias, consumption tax miscalculation bias, or income determination. In Blumkin et al.’s (2012) 
                                                   
３ We define the income tax rate as 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 and the consumption tax rate as 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐. When all income is spent on 
consumption goods, the income tax rate that brings in the same amount of consumption tax is 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 =
𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)⁄ < 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐. The consumption tax rate that brings in the same amount of income tax is smaller than 
the income tax rate because the denomination of the consumption tax is larger than the income tax. 
４ Consumption tax is imposed on the before-tax price ($909 thousand in this case). 
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study, subjects endogenously determine their incomes and consumption under a given tax 
system. In this paper, subjects choose a tax system under a set of given income and consumption 
assumptions. Given an income distribution and the assumption that subjects consume all income, 
subjects choose a preferable tax system from two options. The set of two options includes three 
types: a 20% income tax and a 25% consumption tax, a 20% income tax and a 22% 
consumption tax, and a 20% income tax and a 20% consumption tax.５ The first set of two 
options is revenue neutral and the others are not revenue neutral. One tax choice for each 
subject is randomly selected and the choice is imposed on his or her payment. The sequence of 
the experiment is as follows: First, subjects choose tax systems before their incomes are 
determined. Second, their incomes are determined randomly or on the basis of their 
performance in a real-effort task. Third, subjects choose tax systems again. Fourth, subjects 
solve computational questions about cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick 2005) and the 
amount of income and consumption taxes. Finally, the imposed tax system is determined. 
Our main findings are as follows: First, when the tax burden is equivalent, subjects prefer 
the 20% income tax to the 25% consumption tax. Second, subjects prefer the 20% income tax to 
the 22% consumption taxes, even though the 22% consumption taxes are a lesser burden than 
the 20% income tax. Third, when the tax rates are the same, 20%, subjects prefer the 20% 
consumption tax, which is a lesser burden than the 20% income tax. Fourth, subjects tend to 
prefer consumption tax to income tax when their incomes are determined by a real-effort than 
when their incomes are determined randomly. 
The equivalence between income and consumption taxes isn’t hold by the consumption tax 
miscalculation bias, because subjects prefer the 20% income tax to the 25% consumption tax. 
Subjects calculate the tax burden of a consumption tax in the same way as an income tax. 
Subjects do not prefer consumption tax, which has a higher nominal rate than income tax. 
Hence, subjects evaluate the tax systems not on the real tax burden but on the nominal tax rate. 
Furthermore, even when the financial burden of consumption tax is smaller than the financial 
burden of income tax, subjects prefer the 20% income tax to the 22% consumption taxes 
because the nominal consumption tax rate is higher than the nominal income tax rate. In this 
situation, subjects feel a larger financial burden from consumption tax. When the nominal 
consumption tax rate is identical to the nominal income tax rate, subjects feel the same burden 
                                                   
５ It seems that the consumption tax (20–25%) that we use in the experiment is higher than the 
consumption rate (8%) that is imposed on consumption goods at the time of conducting the experiment in 
Japan. However, the experimental consumption tax rate is not a high enough consumption tax in Europe. 
Furthermore, Braun and Joines (2015) showed that if the government of Japan corrected fiscal imbalances 
using only an increase in the consumption tax, the consumption tax rate needs to gradually rise to 46% in 
2100 and then eventually fall to 36.37%. Therefore, the consumption tax (20–25%) is important for Japan 
in the future. 
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for both these taxes and do not prefer income tax if the amount of tax is equivalent. This result 
is consistent with that of Blumkin et al. (2012) under the tax rate illusion. 
We also find that only one-third of the subjects evaluate the tax system based on the tax 
burden. One-third of the subjects, who are supposed to prefer a consumption tax over an income 
tax if tax owed is equivalent, prefer the 20% income tax to the 25% consumption tax. They are 
consumption tax miscalculation-biased subjects. One-third of the subjects prefer an income tax 
independent of tax rates. The result that subjects prefer the 20% income tax to the 25% 
consumption tax implies that they seemingly prefer an income tax to a consumption tax when 
income and consumption taxes are equivalent. However, if we regard the miscalculation biased 
as subjects who prefer a consumption tax when these taxes are equivalent, the proportion 
preferring an income tax nearly equals that preferring a consumption tax.  
Our result implies that one of the origins of tax misperception is the fact that people 
incorrectly understand the definition of tax. Many people miscalculate the amount of 
consumption tax because they misunderstand that consumption tax is declared by tax inclusive, 
as in the case of income tax, despite consumption tax being tax exclusive. If we standardize all 
taxes as being tax inclusive, people can correctly calculate the amount of taxes and make 
unbiased decisions. Even if people consider the existence of taxes, they are likely to 
miscalculate the amount of tax. Taxes should be presented in ways that are difficult to 
miscalculate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental 
design, and section 3 explains the hypothesis. We present experimental results in section 4. 
Section 5 discusses results and presents conclusions. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
We conducted the experiment in December 2015 with 105 student subjects at Osaka 
University. We conducted four sessions: Each session involved 25, 28, 25, and 27 subjects. The 
average duration of the experiment was 60 minutes. The average payment per subject was 
¥2,767 (approximately USD 22 at the time of the experiment). The experiment was 
programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
In the experiment, subjects chose a preferable tax system from two tax systems, given an 
income distribution and the assumption that subjects consume all income. Figure 1 shows the 
sequence of our experiment. After reading the instructions, subjects chose between two tax 
systems three times before their incomes were determined. After subjects chose the tax system, 
their incomes were determined and then they again chose a tax system between two options. 
After the tax choices, subjects solved computational questions. Finally, if subjects completed the 
exit survey, one tax choice for each subject was randomly selected and the total consumption 
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was converted into his or her payment under the tax choice.６  
We define income distribution as {1600, 2200, 2500, 3100, and 4500 points}. The number 
of subjects for each income level was designed to be even by each session. We assumed that 
subjects consume all income. The set of tax systems is as follows: 
 
1) A 20% income tax or a 25% consumption tax  
2) A 20% income tax or a 22% consumption tax 
3) A 20% income tax or a 20% consumption tax 
 
The time restriction before their incomes were determined was 120 seconds and that after their 
incomes were determined was 60 seconds. The before-tax income and consumption is displayed 
in the second tax choice. 
Table 1 shows the after-tax income and consumption. We explained that income tax is a tax 
in proportion to income. When we define an income as 𝑌𝑌 and the income tax rate as 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦, the 
amount of tax is 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑌𝑌. For example, if the income tax rate is 20%, the amount of tax for the first 
quintile is 320 (= 0.2 × 1600). We explained that consumption tax is a tax in proportion to 
consumption and the tax-inclusive amount of consumption does not change even if the 
consumption tax is imposed; the net (substantial) consumption subtracts the amount of tax from 
the consumption in responding to the income. When we define consumption including tax as 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and the consumption tax rate as 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐, the amount of tax is (𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)⁄ )𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. For example, if 
the consumption tax rate is 25%, the amount of tax for the first quintile is 320 
(= (0.25 (1 + 0.25)⁄ ) × 1600). 
The provisional incomes were assigned to subjects in two possible ways: randomly 
(henceforth “Random”) or on the basis of their relative performance in a real-effort task 
(henceforth “Real-effort”).７ These two methods were designed to mimic some determinants of 
economic success in real life.８ Random mimics luck and Real-effort mimics hard work. We use 
a slider task (Gill and Prowse 2012) as a Real-effort task.９ Figure 2 shows the screen of a 
slider task. There are 48 sliders positioned at 0 at the first time. By using the mouse, subjects 
adjusted the slider to position it at 50 as much as possible. The time given to do this was 120 
seconds. After the first tax choice task, subjects practiced the slider task twice. After the practice, 
                                                   
６ We converted 1 point into ¥1. 
７ 53 subjects were assigned to Random and 52 subjects were assigned to Real-effort income groups. 
８ Other determinants are family background, acquired knowledge, and ability (Durante et al. 2014). 
９ Gill and Prowse (2011) point out four advantages of a slider task as a real-effort task compared with 
other real-effort tasks. First, the slider task is simple to understand and does not require pre-existing 
knowledge. Second, the slider task is identical every time, unlike solving math problems, negotiating 
mazes, or solving anagrams. Third, the slider task has little randomness. Fourth, there is no scope for 
guessing in the slider task. 
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subjects started into the main part of the slider task and their incomes were determined by their 
relative performance.１０ 
Subjects solved computational questions before the exit survey. Congdon et al. (2011) and 
Abeler and Jager (2015) showed that cognitive and computational ability are related to tax 
perceptions. To measure cognitive ability, we used a CRT test (Frederick 2005).１１ To identify 
whether subjects understood the manner of tax calculation, we asked comprehension questions 
about each tax calculation. One question (TaxQ1) concerned income tax: “If an income tax rate 
is 20%, which alternative presents the correct answer for calculating the tax owed by someone 
whose income is ¥1 million?” The other question (TaxQ2) concerned consumption tax: “If a 
consumption tax rate is 20%, which alternative presents the correct answer for calculating the 
tax owed by someone whose consumption is ¥1 million?” Subjects chose the following 
alternatives: “1 million ×  20 80⁄ ,” “1 million × 20 100⁄ ,” “1 million ×  20 120⁄ ,” and “none 
of the above.” The correct answer for TaxQ1 is “1 million × 20 100⁄ .” The correct answer for 
TaxQ2 is “1 million × 20 120⁄ .” 
In the exit survey, we asked subjects hypothetical questions about tax: “Suppose the 
amounts owed in income tax and consumption tax are equivalent, which tax do you prefer if 
either must be imposed?” Subjects chose the following alternatives: “I’d like to impose an 
income tax,” “It’s indifferent for me,” and “I’d like to impose a consumption tax.” This 
hypothetical question can elicit direct preferences without miscalculating the amount of tax 
owed. In the exit survey, the subjects who chose “I’d like to impose an income tax” were 
defined as a subject who prefers income tax in the exit survey and those who chose “I’d like to 
impose a consumption tax” were defined as a subject who prefers consumption tax in the exit 
survey. 
Table 2 shows individual characteristics and computational abilities of subjects. Some 
characteristics are not balanced between treatments. We will control individual characteristics in 
the subsequent empirical analysis. About 40% of subjects calculated all answers correctly in the 
CRT test, and only 20% of subjects calculated consumption tax correctly. The proportion of 
subjects who prefer consumption tax in Random was significantly higher than that of subjects 
who prefer income tax (𝑝𝑝 = 0.067). The proportion of subjects who prefer consumption tax in 
Real-effort was slightly higher than that of subjects who prefer income tax, but this finding is 
not statistically significant (𝑝𝑝 = 0.381). 
                                                   
１０ Before the main part of the slider task, subjects forecast their income rank in the main part. 
１１ We use three well-known questions. CRT1: A bat and a ball cost ¥11,000. The bat costs ¥1,000 more 
than the ball. How much does the ball cost? CRT2: If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, 
how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? CRT3: In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. 
Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
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3. Hypotheses 
In this experiment, income 𝑌𝑌 equals total consumption including tax, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, so that if the 
amount of income tax is equivalent to the amount of consumption tax, the relationship between 
the income tax rate 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 and the consumption tax rate 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 is 
𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 = 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 < 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 . 
Hence, the nominal consumption tax rate is higher than the nominal income tax rate when the 
consumption tax burden is equivalent to the income tax burden. The 20% income tax is 
equivalent to the 25% consumption tax. The consumption taxes (22% and 20%) are less of a 
burden than the 20% income tax. Therefore, if subjects can rationally calculate the amount of 
tax, the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1A: Subjects can rationally calculate the amount of tax. 
If subjects can rationally calculate the amount of tax, they choose a less burdensome tax system: 
The 20% income tax is indifferent to the 25% consumption tax. Subjects choose the 
consumption taxes (22% and 20%), which are less burdensome than the 20% income tax. 
 
However, subjects are likely to miscalculate the amount of consumption tax, which suggests 
that they do not understand the difference between the definitions of consumption tax and 
income tax. Subjects may not understand that consumption taxes are imposed on the before-tax 
price. If subjects misunderstand that consumption taxes are imposed on the after-tax price, they 
evaluate the tax systems on the basis of comparing the nominal tax rates. Therefore, if subjects 
miscalculate the amount of consumption tax, the behavioral hypothesis is as below: 
 
Hypothesis 1B: Subjects miscalculate consumption taxes. 
If subjects calculate the amount of consumption tax like the amount of income tax, they evaluate 
the tax systems on the basis of comparing the nominal tax rates. Subjects choose the 20% 
income tax, which seems to be less burdensome than the consumption taxes (25% and 22%). 
Subjects are indifferent in choosing between the 20% income tax and 20% consumption tax. 
 
Blumkin et al. (2012) showed that income and consumption taxes are not equivalent 
because subjects reduce their effort more in response to income tax than to an equivalent 
consumption tax. This is because subjects ignore the existence of consumption tax when they 
provide their effort in the case of imposed consumption tax, though they cognize the existence 
of income tax when they provide their effort in the case of imposed income tax. Therefore, if we 
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get the same result as that of Blumkin et al. (2012), the hypothesis is as below: 
 
Hypothesis 1C: Subjects ignore consumption taxes. 
If subjects ignore the consumption tax, they choose the consumption taxes (25%, 22%, and 20%). 
 
Subjects in Blumkin et al.’s (2012) study might have not preferred income tax because 
income was determined on the basis of their performance of a real-effort task. Durante et al. 
(2014) showed that subjects support a lower income tax when their incomes are determined on 
the basis of their performance rather than when their incomes are determined randomly. This 
result implies that subjects do not prefer income tax when their incomes are determined by their 
performance of a real-effort task.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
Subjects do not prefer income tax when their incomes are determined on the basis of their 
performance of the real-effort task (Real-effort income group) as opposed to when their incomes 
are determined randomly (Random income group). 
 
4. Experimental Results 
In this section, we first show the proportion of each chosen tax to test two hypotheses. 
Second, we classify subjects based on the tax choice patterns. 
 
4.1. Tax Choices 
In Table 3, we regress a set of experimental conditions on tax choices. The dependent 
variable is 1 if a subject chooses an income tax and 0 if a subject chooses a consumption tax. 
We use a linear probability model with the standard error clustered by subject. When subjects 
chose between the 20% income tax and the 25% consumption tax, 86.8% chose income tax 
before their incomes were determined (column 1). There was no difference in preference for tax 
systems before and after their incomes were determined. Compared with the Random income 
group, the proportion of subjects choosing income tax in the Real-effort income group was less 
than 13.7 percent points. The proportion of subjects choosing income tax is significantly higher 
than 50% in all cases. This result implies that subjects prefer the 20% income tax to the 25% 
consumption tax, though the amount of the 20% income tax is equivalent to that of the 25% 
consumption tax. The result supports Hypothesis 1B. Subjects do not prefer an income tax that 
has a higher nominal tax rate than an equivalent income tax because subjects calculate the 
financial burden of consumption tax in the same way as that for income tax. 
When subjects chose between the 20% income tax and 22% consumption tax, 71.7% chose 
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income tax before their incomes were determined (column 2 of Table 3). There was no 
difference in preference for tax systems before and after their incomes were determined. The 
proportion of subjects choosing income tax was significantly higher than 50% in all cases. This 
result implies that subjects prefer the 20% income tax to the 22% consumption tax. The result 
also supports Hypothesis 1B. 
When subjects chose between the 20% income tax and the 20% consumption tax, 39.6% 
chose income tax before their incomes were determined (column 3 of Table 3). There was no 
difference in preference for tax systems before and after their incomes were determined. 
Although subjects are indifferent to the choice between income tax and consumption tax before 
their incomes (Random) are determined, the proportion of subjects choosing income tax is 
significantly lower than 50% in other cases. This result implies that subjects tend to prefer the 
20% consumption tax to the 20% income tax when the nominal tax rates are identical. Under the 
consumption tax miscalculation bias, the result supports Hypothesis 1C that subjects prefer 
consumption tax because of the consumption tax ignorance bias. 
In the regression in Table 4, we treat parameters of consumption taxes as independent 
variables and the dependent variable is an income tax choice dummy in the same manner as in 
Table 3. We control another set of experimental conditions, individual characteristics, and 
computational abilities on tax choices. Subjects do not prefer the 20% income tax to the 20% 
consumption tax and the 22% consumption tax compared with the 25% consumption tax 
(column 1). Subjects in the Real-effort group do not prefer income tax to consumption tax more 
than subjects in the Random group. This result supports Hypothesis 2. These results do not 
change with controlling individual characteristics (column 2). In column 3, we control 
computational abilities. Subjects who are all correct in CRT questions prefer an income tax over 
a consumption tax. Even subjects who can correctly answer the CRT questions miscalculate the 
amount of tax burden. Subjects who are all correct in TaxQs tend to choose the 22% 
consumption tax over the 20% income tax. This result implies that subjects who misunderstand 
the definition of a consumption tax prefer the 20% income tax to the 22% consumption tax, 
despite the 20% income tax having higher tax burden than the 22% consumption tax. 
 
4.2. Subject types 
Table 5 shows the subject types based on the tax choice patterns. We defined “strong CT 
lover” as a subject who always chose consumption taxes rather than income tax. We 
defined “IT lover” as a subject who chose income tax when the tax burdens are equivalent and 
chose consumption taxes 22% and 20% otherwise. We defined “miscalculation biased” as a 
subject who chose the consumption tax 20% only when the nominal tax rates are equivalent and 
chose income tax otherwise. We defined “strong IT lover” as a subject who always chose the 
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20% income tax rather than consumption taxes. The strong CT lover and the CT lover evaluate 
the tax systems based on the amount of tax burden, because they choose less tax burden. Such 
subjects are only one-third. Most subjects have an irrational choice. One-third subjects choose 
consumption tax if the nominal consumption tax rate is identical to the nominal income tax rate 
(the miscalculation biased). The strong IT lover implies that these subjects prefer income tax to 
consumption tax in general. Although subjects seemingly prefer an income tax over a 
consumption tax when both taxes are equivalent, the proportion preferring an income tax nearly 
equals that preferring a consumption tax if we assume that subjects with a miscalculation bias 
prefer a consumption tax when these taxes are equivalent. 
Table 6 shows the relationship between subject types and individual characteristics. We use 
multinomial logit estimation. The figures show the average marginal effect. Subjects who 
correctly answer the TaxQs are likely to be strong CT lovers or IT lovers. They evaluate tax 
systems based on their tax burden, because they can calculate it correctly. If tax burdens are 
equivalent, their choice depends on their individual preferences concerning taxes. A subject who 
prefers consumption tax in the exit survey, who prefer consumption tax if its burden equals that 
of an income tax among subjects who cannot correctly answer the TaxQs are likely to be 
miscalculation biased. This result supports that they prefer the 20% income tax to the 25% and 
22% consumption taxes because they do not understand the definition of a consumption tax. A 
subject who prefers consumption tax in the exit survey among subjects who answer the TaxQs 
correctly are likely to be the strong CT lovers. They can calculate the tax burden correctly and 
prefer a consumption tax if amounts owed are equivalent. The table also shows that a subject 
who prefers consumption tax in the exit survey is likely to be IT lovers and miscalculation 
biased. This result indicates that some subjects who answered the TaxQs correctly did not 
understand the calculation at the time of the experiment but understood it in the TaxQs. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We examine whether income and consumption taxes are equivalent throughout a choice 
experiment. Subjects prefer the 20% income tax to the 25% consumption tax where they are 
equivalent. This result implies that the equivalence between income tax and consumption tax 
does not hold because of the consumption tax miscalculation bias. Subjects calculate the amount 
of consumption tax in the same way as an income tax calculation, which implies that subjects 
mistakenly perceive consumption tax, which has a higher nominal tax rate than income tax, as 
having a heavier burden. Consequently, subjects prefer the 20% income tax, which has a lower 
nominal tax rate than the 25% consumption tax. Moreover, subjects prefer the 20% income tax 
to the 22% consumption taxes, despite the amount of consumption tax being smaller than the 
amount of income tax. This result also indicates the existence of the consumption tax 
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miscalculation bias. Most subjects cannot correctly calculate the amount of consumption tax. 
Subjects prefer the 20% consumption tax to the 20% income tax when the nominal tax rate is 
identical. Subjects misunderstand that the amount of consumption tax equals the amount of 
income tax because subjects miscalculate the amount of consumption tax. If subjects see that the 
financial burden between the two taxes is equivalent, they prefer consumption tax to income tax. 
This result is consistent with that of Blumkin et al. (2012) under the tax rate illusion. 
In Blumkin et al.’s (2012) and Chetty et al.’s (2009) studies, the misperception of tax results 
from ignoring consumption tax. In particular, the equivalence between consumption and income 
taxes is not held by the consumption ignorance bias in Blumkin et al.’s (2012) study. On the 
other hand, our result implies that consumption and income taxes are not equivalent because 
people miscalculate the financial burden of consumption tax even if they can take into account 
consumption tax. 
Miscalculation of tax is attributed to an insufficient understanding of tax definitions. Our 
result implies that people calculate the amount of consumption tax as if it is tax inclusive 
despite it being tax exclusive, so people miscalculate the amount of consumption tax as they 
often do not realize it is already included in the prices. In tax reforms of the future, if all 
notations of taxes were standardized as tax inclusive, people could correctly calculate them. As 
a result, people could make an unbiased decision. There is a possibility that people miscalculate 
the amount of tax even if they consider the existence of tax, so that taxes should be presented by 
the notation of being difficult to miscalculate. 
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Figure 1 Experimental timeline 
 
 
Figure 2 Screen of the slider task  
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Table 1 After-tax parameters 
 
  
Tax system [Tax revenue]
Income
 [After-tax income]
Total consumption
[After-tax consumption]
20% income tax [2780]
1st quintile 1600 [1280] 1280
2nd quintile 2200 [1760] 1760
3rd quintile 2500 [2000] 2000
4th quintile 3100 [2480] 2480
5th quintile 4500 [3600] 3600
25% consumption tax [2780]
1st quintile 1600 1600 [1280]
2nd quintile 2200 2200 [1760]
3rd quintile 2500 2500 [2000]
4th quintile 3100 3100 [2480]
5th quintile 4500 4500 [3600]
22% consumption tax [2510]
1st quintile 1600 1600 [1310]
2nd quintile 2200 2200 [1800]
3rd quintile 2500 2500 [2050]
4th quintile 3100 3100 [2540]
5th quintile 4500 4500 [3690]
20% consumption tax [2320]
1st quintile 1600 1600 [1330]
2nd quintile 2200 2200 [1830]
3rd quintile 2500 2500 [2080]
4th quintile 3100 3100 [2580]
5th quintile 4500 4500 [3750]
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Table 2 Summary statistics of individual characteristics and computational abilities 
 
Note: “Other major” includes foreign language, health, and humanity majors. 
  
Random Real-effort Difference
Age 22.57 21.33 1.24***
(1.76) (1.62) (0.33)
Female 0.38 0.38 -0.01
(0.49) (0.49) (0.10)
Undergrad 0.62 0.81 -0.19**
(0.49) (0.40) (0.09)
Economics major 0.04 0.06 -0.02
(0.04) (0.24) (0.04)
Social science major (excl. economics) 0.23 0.13 0.09
(0.42) (0.34) (0.08)
Engineering major 0.40 0.46 -0.07
(0.49) (0.50) (0.10)
Natural science major 0.06 0.15 -0.10
(0.23) (0.36) (0.06)
Other major 0.28 0.19 0.09
(0.41) (0.40) (0.08)
CRT all correct 0.36 0.38 -0.03
(0.48) (0.49) (0.10)
TaxQ1 (income tax) correct 0.98 1.00 -0.02
(0.14) (0.00) (0.02)
TaxQ2 (consumption tax) correct 0.17 0.29 -0.12
(0.38) (0.46) (0.08)
TaxQ all correct 0.17 0.29 -0.12
(0.38) (0.46) (0.08)
Subject who prefers income tax in the exit survey 0.32 0.38 -0.06
(0.47) (0.49) (0.10)
Subject who prefers consumption tax in the exit survey 0.51 0.42 0.09
(0.50) (0.50) (0.08)
Observations 53 52
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Table 3 Effects of experimental conditions on preferences for income and consumption taxes 
 
Notes: Dependent variable = 1 if a subject chooses an income tax (IT). Dependent variable = 0 
if a subject chooses a consumption tax (CT). Standard errors clustered by subject reported in 
parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
  
IT (20%) or CT (25%) IT (20%) or CT (22%) IT (20%) or CT (20%)
(1) (2) (3)
After 0.038 0.075 -0.019
(0.060) (0.065) (0.057)
Slider task -0.137* -0.082 -0.031
(0.078) (0.092) (0.096)
Slider task × After 0.078 -0.037 -0.000
(0.080) (0.094) (0.091)
Constant 0.868*** 0.717*** 0.396***
(0.047) (0.063) (0.068)
Constant = 0.5
F(1, 104) = 61.10
(p=0.00)
F(1, 104) = 12.00
(p=0.00)
F(1, 104) = 2.33
(p=0.13)
Constant + After = 0.5
F(1, 104) = 99.66
(p=0.00)
F(1, 104) = 26.91
(p=0.00)
F(1, 104) = 3.31
(p=0.07)
Constant + Slider task = 0.5
F(1, 104) = 13.74
(p=0.00)
F(1, 104) = 3.97
(p=0.05)
F(1, 104) = 3.97
(p=0.05)
Constant + Slider task + After = 0.5
F(1, 104) = 9.62
(p=0.00)
F(1, 104) = 5.00
(p=0.03)
F(1, 104) = 3.00
(p=0.09)
Observations 210 210 210
Clusters 105 105 105
R2 0.031 0.017 0.001
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Table 4 Effects of experimental conditions and computational abilities 
  
Notes: CT25 is the 25% consumption tax. CT22 is the 22% consumption tax. CT20 is the 20% 
consumption tax. Standard errors clustered by subject reported in parenthesis. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Constant (Baseline: CT25) 0.868*** 2.015*** 1.989***
(0.047) (0.515) (0.492)
CT22 -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.132**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.062)
CT20 -0.472*** -0.472*** -0.449***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.078)
After 0.038 0.038 0.038
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061)
After × CT22 0.038 0.038 0.038
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
After × CT20 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Slider task -0.137* -0.161* -0.150*
(0.078) (0.082) (0.077)
Slider task × CT22 0.055 0.055 0.080
(0.093) (0.094) (0.096)
Slider task × CT20 0.106 0.106 0.119
(0.105) (0.105) (0.107)
Slider task × After 0.078 0.078 0.078
(0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
After × Slider task × CT22 -0.115 -0.115 -0.115
(0.105) (0.106) (0.106)
After × Slider task × CT20 -0.078 -0.078 -0.078
(0.111) (0.112) (0.112)
CRT all correct 0.097*
(0.056)
CRT all correct × CT22 0.054
(0.060)
CRT all correct × CT20 -0.013
(0.095)
TaxQ all correct -0.125
(0.084)
TaxQ all correct × CT22 -0.224**
(0.086)
TaxQ all correct × CT20 -0.107
(0.105)
Individual controls No Yes Yes
Observations 630 630 630
Clusters 105 105 105
R2 0.178 0.218 0.265
Income tax (1) or consumption tax (0)
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Table 5 Subject type 
 
Notes: Strong CT lover is a subject who always chooses consumption taxes rather than 
income tax. IT lover is a subject who chooses income tax only when the tax burdens are 
equivalent and choses consumption taxes 22% and 20% otherwise. Miscalculation biased is a 
subject who chooses the 20% consumption tax when the nominal tax rates are equivalent and 
income tax otherwise. Strong IT lover is a subject who always chooses the 20% income tax 
rather than consumption taxes. 
 
Table 6 Effect of computational abilities and direct tax preference on subject type 
 
 
Notes: Experimental conditions and individual characteristics are also controlled. Figures report 
average marginal effects. Standard errors are calculated by delta-method.  
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
  
Strong CT lover IT lover Miscalculation biased Strong IT lover Others
Income (Random)
Before 11.3% 13.2% 34.0% 35.8% 5.7%
After 9.4% 11.3% 41.5% 37.7% 0.0%
Income (Real-effort)
Before 17.3% 15.4% 25.0% 28.8% 13.5%
After 15.4% 17.3% 32.7% 34.6% 0.0%
Strong CT lover IT lover Miscalculation biased Strong IT lover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TaxQ all correct 0.350*** 0.250** -0.115 0.045
(0.124) (0.099) (0.231) (0.185)
Prefer IT in the exit survey 0.074 -0.036 0.083 -0.073
(0.087) (0.092) (0.117) (0.094)
Prefer CT in the exit survey 0.086 0.025 0.268*** -0.238***
(0.076) (0.077) (0.105) (0.091)
Prefer IT × TaxQ all correct -0.280* -0.069 0.272 0.028
(0.145) (0.129) (0.268) (0.219)
Prefer CT × TaxQ all correct 0.290* 0.515*** 1.744*** -3.415***
(0.166) (0.169) (0.304) (0.317)
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Appendix: Instructions (translated from Japanese)  
 
Experimental Contents 
 
In this experiment, you choose a “tax system” in a hypothetical world. The “tax” in this 
experiment is not the real tax that is imposed on payment but a hypothetical tax. 
 
First, your “income” is determined by a method (as described herein). The “income” is assigned 
to five income ranks (1600, 2200, 2500, 3100, and 4500 points). In responding to an “income,” 
the amount of “consumption” is automatically determined. The set of “income” and 
“consumption” is as below: 
 
Income (points) 1600 2200 2500 3100 4500 
Consumption (points) 1600 2200 2500 3100 4500 
 
However, a “tax” is imposed on this “income” and “consumption.” The effective “tax” depends 
on your choice (as described herein). A “tax” is of two types. The example tax rate is just an 
example and may be different from the experimental tax rate. The taxed point under 10 points is 
rounded off. 
 
1. Income tax 
An income tax is a tax in proportion to income. For example, if the income tax rate is 10%, your 
income reduces by 10%. Your consumption also reduces the same proportion in responding to 
your income. In other words, if the income tax rate is 10%, the consumption is also reduced by 
10%. 
 
2. Consumption tax 
A consumption tax is a tax in proportion to consumptions, and the tax-inclusive amount of 
consumption does not change even if the consumption tax is imposed; the net (substantial) 
consumption is found by subtracting the amount of taxation from consumption in responding to 
the income. 
 
We converted the after-tax total consumption into your payment (1 point = ¥1). 
 
 “Income” determination for Random group [Real-effort group] 
The “income” is randomly assigned to five income ranks (each 20% probability) by a computer. 
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The number of subjects is evenly assigned to the five income ranks. 
[The “income” is determined on the basis of your performance of a “slider task.” We explain 
later the slider task and your income in detail.] 
 
 Effective “tax system” determination 
In this experiment, each person chooses a tax between two options multiple times before and 
after your income is determined. One tax choice for each person is randomly selected and the 
tax is imposed on your payment 
 
 
Experimental Procedure 
 
This experiment is conducted using a computer. Please follow the directions of the computer. 
Mind the time restriction. 
 
1. “Tax” choice (before your income is determined) 
You choose a tax between two options. After choosing one option, you press the OK button. The 
time restriction is 120 seconds. The tax choice is conducted multiple times. 
 
2. Income determination 
Your income is determined randomly [on the basis of your performance of a task]. Please 
confirm your income displayed in front of you. 
 
3. “Tax” choice (after your income is determined) 
You choose a tax between two options. After choosing one option, you press the OK button. The 
time restriction is 60 seconds. The tax choice is conducted multiple times. 
 
4. Calculation of after-tax income and consumption 
First, one tax choice for each person is randomly selected and the tax is imposed on your 
payment. Please confirm after-tax income and consumption. 
 
After checking your payment, please answer a survey. 
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Explanation of a Slider Task 
 
In this task, there are 48 sliders on your screen, as in the below figure. By using the mouse, you 
adjust the slider to the position at 50 as much as possible. The time restriction is 120 seconds. 
 
Each slider is positioned at 0 at the first time and you can move each slider to 100. Each value 
of the slider is displayed at the right of each slider. By using the mouse, you adjust the sliders. 
You can adjust the position of each slider as many times as you want. Your point in this task is 
the number of the slider positioned at 50 at the end of the task. 
 
You practice the slider task twice before you move on to the main part of the task. 
 
Income determination 
Your income is determined on the basis of your relative performance of a slider task. The better 
you perform, the more income you can get. The number of subjects is evenly assigned to the 
five income ranks. For example, if the number of participants is 20, 4 people are assigned to 
each income rank. 
 
Experimental procedure 
1. Practice task (120 seconds × 2) 
You practice the slider task twice. This task does not determine your income rank. 
 
2. Forecasting income rank task 
You forecast your income rank on the main part of the slider task before moving on to the main 
part. Please choose an income rank that likely to be assigned. 
 
3. Main task (120 seconds) 
You try the main part of the slider task. The time restriction is 120 seconds. 
 
4. Result summary 
Please confirm your income. 
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Figure Screen of the slider task 
 
 
